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The human brain and the internet share a key feature in their layout; a web-like structure of individual nodes acting in unison to transmit information between physical locations. In brains we have neurons, comprised in turn of myelinated axons and dendrites. The internet is comprised of similar entities, with connections such as fibre optics and ethernet cabling acting as the mode of transport for information. Computers and routers act as gateways (boosting/re-routing) and originators of such information.

How can we describe the physical structure and complexity of these two networks? Does this offer any insight into their similarities and differences? What is the plausibility of a conscious Internet? These are the questions I would like to explore in this article.

At a very basic level, both networks are organic in nature (surprisingly, in the case of the Internet); that is, they are not the product of an ubiquitous ‘designer’ and are given the freedom to evolve as their environment sees fit. The Internet is given permission to grow without a directed plan. New nodes and capacity added haphazardly. The naturally evolved topology of the Internet is one that is distributed; the destruction of nodes has little effect on the overall operational effectiveness of the network. Each node has multiple connections, resulting in an intrinsic redundancy where traffic is automatically re-routed to the target destination via alternate paths.

We can observe a similar behaviour in the human brain. Neurological plasticity serves a function akin to the distributed nature of the Internet. Following injury to regions of the brain, adjacent areas can compensate for lost abilities by restructuring neuronal patterns. For example, injuries to the frontal cortex motor area can be minimised with adjacent regions ‘re-learning’ otherwise mundane tasks that have since been lost as a result of the injury. While such recoveries are entirely possibly with extensive rehabilitation, two key factors determine the likelihood and efficiency of the operation; the intensity of the injury (percentage of brain tissue destroyed, location of injury) and leading from this, the chronological length of recovery. These factors introduce the first discrepancy between these two networks.

Unlike the brain, the Internet is resilient to attacks on its infrastructure. Local downtime is a minor inconvenience as traffic moves around such bottlenecks by taking the next fastest path available. Destruction of multiple nodes has little effect on the overall web of information. Users may loose access to or experience slowness in certain areas, but compared to the remainder of possible locations (not to mention redundancies in content – simply obtain the information elsewhere) such lapses are just momentary inconveniences. But are we suffering from a lack of perspective when considering the similarities of the brain and the virtual world? Perhaps the problem is one related to a sense of scale. The destruction of nodes (computers) could instead be interpreted in the brain as the removal of individual neurons. If one takes this proposition then the differences begin to loose their lucidity.

An irrefutable difference, however, arises when one considers both the complexity and the purpose of the two networks. The brain contains some 100 billion neurons, whilst the Internet comprises a measly 1 billion users by comparison (with users roughly equating the number of nodes, or access terminals that are physically connected to the Internet). Brains are the direct product of evolution, created specifically to keep the organism alive in an unwelcoming and hostile living environment. The Internet, on the other hand, is designed to accommodate a never-ending torrent of expanding human knowledge.  Thus the dichotomy in purpose between these two networks is quite distinguished, with the brain focusing on reactionary and automated responses to stimuli while the Internet aims to store information and process requests for its extraction to the end user.

Again we can take a step back and consider the similarities of these two networks. Looking at topology, it is apparent that the distributed nature of the Internet is similar to the structure and redundancy of the human brain. In addition, the Internet is described as a ‘scale-free’ or power-law network, indicating that a small percentage of highly connected nodes accounts for a very large percentage of the overall traffic flow. In effect, a targeted attack on these nodes would be successful in totally destroying the network. The brain, by comparison, appears to be organised into distinct and compartmentalised regions. Target just a few or even one of these collections of cells and the whole network collapses.

It would be interesting to empirically investigate the hypothesis that the brain is also a scale-free network that is graphically represented via a power law. Targetting the thalamus for destruction, (which is a central hub through which sensory information is redirected) might have the same devastating effect on the brain as destroying the ICANN headquarters in the USA (responsible for domain name assignment).

As aforementioned, the purposes of these two networks are different, yet share the common bond of processing and transferring information. At such a superficial level we see that the brain and the Internet are merely storage and retrieval devices, upon which the user (or directed thought process) are sent on a journey through a virtual world towards their intended target (notwithstanding the inevitable sidetracks along the way!). Delving deeper, the differences in purpose act as a deterrent when one considers the plausibility of consciousness and self-awareness.

Which brings us to the cusp of the article. Could the Internet, given sufficient complexity, become a conscious entity in the same vein as the human brain? Almost immediately the hypothesis is dashed due to its rebellion against common sense. Surely it is impossible to propose that a communications network based upon binary machines and internet protocols could ever achieve a higher plane of existence. But the answer might not be as clear cut as one would like to believe. controversially, both networks could be controlled by indeterminate processes. The brain, at its very essence, is governed by quantum unpredictability. Likewise, activity on the Internet is directed by self-aware, indeterminate beings (which in turn, are the result of quantum processes). At what point does the flow of information over a sufficiently complex network result in an emergent complexity mots notably characterised by a self-aware intelligence? Just as neurons react to the incoming electrical pulses of information, so too do the computers of the internet pass along packets of data. Binary code is equated with action potentials; either information is transmitted or not.

Perhaps the most likely (and worrying) outcome in a futurist world would be the integration of an artificial self-aware intelligence with the Internet. Think Skynet from the Terminator franchise. In all possibility such an agent would have the tools at its disposal to highjack the Internet’s comprising nodes and reprogram them in such a fashion as to facilitate the growth of an even greater intelligence. The analogy here is if the linking of human minds were possible, the resulting intelligence would be great indeed – imagine a distributed network of humanity, each individual brain linked to thousands of others in a grand web of shared knowledge and experience.

Fortunately such a doomsday outlook is most likely constrained within the realms of science fiction. Reality tends to have a reassuring banality about it that prevents the products of human creativity from becoming something more solid and tangible. Whatever the case may be in regards to the future of artificial intelligence, the Internet will continue to grow in complexity and penetration. As end user technology improves, we take a continual step closer towards an emergent virtual consciousness, whether it be composed of ‘uploaded’ human minds or something more artificial in nature. Let’s just hope that a superior intelligence can find a use for humanity in such a future society.

The topic of free-will is one of the largest problems facing modern philosophers. An increasing empirical onslaught has done little to alleviate these murky waters. In actuality, each scientific breakthrough has resulted in greater philosophical confusion, whether it be due to an impractical knowledge base that is needed to interpret these results or counter-intuitive outcomes (RP signal, brain activity precedes conscious action). My own attempts to shed some light onto this matter are equally feeble, which has precipated the creation of the present article. What is the causal nature of the universe? Is each action determined and directly predictable from a sufficiently detailed starting point or is there a degree of inherent uncertainty? How can we reconcile the observation that free-will appears to be a valid characteristic of humanity with mounting scientific evidence to the contrary (eg Grand Unified Theory)? These are the questions I would like to discuss.

‘Emergent’ seems to be the latest buzzword in popular science. While the word is appealing when describing how complexity can arise from relatively humble beginnings, it does very little to actually explain the underlying process. These two states are simply presented on a platter, the lining of which is composed of fanciful ’emergent’ conjourings. While there is an underlying science behind the process involving dynamic systems (modelled on biological growth and movement), there does seem to be an element of hand waving and mystique.

This state of affairs does nothing to help current philosophical floundering. Intuitively, free-will is an attractive feature of the universe. People feel comfortable knowing that they have a degree of control over the course of their life. A loss of such control could even be construed as a faciliator of mental illness (depression, bipolar disorder). Therefore, the attempts of science to develop a unified theory of complete causal prediction seems to undermine our very nature as human beings. Certainly, some would embrace the notion of a deterministic universe with open arms, happy to put uncertainty to an end. However, one would do well (from a Eudamonic point of view) to cognitively reframe anxiety regarding the future to an expectation of suprise and anticipation at the unknown.

While humanity is firmly divided over their preference for a predictable or uncertain universe, the problem remains that we appear to have a causally determined universe with individual freedom of choice and action. Quantum theory has undermined determinism and causality to an extent, with the phenomenon of spontaneous vaccuum energy supporting the possibility of events occuring without any obvious cause. Such evidence is snapped up happily by proponents of free-will with little regard as to its real-world plausibility.This is another example of philosophical hand-waving, where the real problem involves a form of question begging; that is, a circular argument with the premise requiring a proof of itself in order to remain valid! For example, the following argument is often used;

  1. Assume quantum fluctuations really are indeterminate in nature (underlying causality ala ‘String Theory’ not applicable).
  2. Free-will requires indeterminacy as a physical prerequisite.
  3. Quantum fluctuations are responsible for free-will.

 To give credit where it is due, the actual arguments used are more defined than that which is outlined above, however the basic structure is similar. Basic premises can be outlined and postulates put forward describing the possible form of neurological free will, however as with most developing fields the supporting evidence is skimp at best. And to make matters worse, quantum theory has shown that human intuition is often not the best method of attempting an explaination.

 However, if we work with what we have, perhaps something useful will result. This includes such informal accounts such as anecdotal evidence. The consideration of such evidence has led to the creation of two ‘maxims’ that seem to summarise the evidence presented in regards to determinsm and free-will.

Maxim one. The degree of determinism within a system is reliant upon the scale of measurement; a macro form of measurement results in a predominantly deterministic outcome, while a micro form of measurement results in an outcome that is predominantly ‘free’ or unpredictable. What this is saying is that determinism and freedom can be directly reconciled and coexist within the same construct of reality. Rather than existing as two distinctly separate entities, these universal characteristics should be reconceptualised as two extremities on a sliding scale of some fundamental quality. Akin to Einstein’s General Relativity, the notions of determinism and freedom are also relative to the observer. In other words, how we examine the fabric of reality (large or small scale) results in a worldview that is either free or constrained by predictability. Specifically, quantum scale measurements allow for an indeterministic universe, while larger scale phenomenon are increasingly easier to predict (with a corresponding decrease in the accuracy in the measurement tool). In short, determinism (or free-will) is not a physical property of the universe, but a characteristic of perception and an artifact of the mesaurement method used. While this maxim seems commonsensical and almost obvious, I believe the idea that both determinism and free-will are reconcilable features of this universe is a valid proposition that warrants further investigation.

Maxim Two: Indeterminacy and free-will are naturally occuring results that emerge from the complex interaction of a sufficient number of interacting deterministic systems (actual mechanisms unknown). Once again we are falling back on the explanatory scapegoat of ’emergence’, however its use is partially justified (in the light of empirical developments). For example, investigations into fractal patterns and the modelling of chaotic systems seems to justify the existence of emergent complexity. Fractals are generated from a finite set of definable equations and result in an intensely complicated geometric figure with infinite regress, the surface features undulating with each magnification (interestingly, fractal patterns are a naturally occuring feature in the physical world, and can result from biological growth patterns and magnetic field lines). Chaos is a similar phenomemon, beginning from reasonably humble initial circumstances, and due to an amalgamation of interferring variables results in an overall system of indeterminacy and unpredictability (eg weather patterns). Perhaps this is the mechanism of human consciousness of freedom of will; individual (and deterministic) neurons contribute enmasse to an overall emergent system that is unpredictable. As a side note, such a position also supports the possibility of artificial intelligence; build something that is sufficiently complex and ‘human-like’ consciousness and freedom will result.

The two maxims proposed may seem to be quite obvious on cursory inspection, however it can be argued that the proposal of a universe in which determinism and freedom of will form two alternative interpretations of a common, underlying reality is unique. Philisophically, the topic is difficult to investigate and discuss due to limitations on empirical knowledge and an increasing requirement for specialised technical insight into the field.

The ultimate goal of modern empiricism is to reduce reality to a strictly deterministic foundation. In keeping with this aim, experimentation hopes to arrive at physical laws of nature that are increasingly accurate and versatile in their generality. Quantum theory has since put this inexorable march on hold while futile attempts are made to circumvent the obstacle that is the uncertainty principle.

Yet perhaps there is a light at the end of the tunnel, however dim the journey may be. Science may yet produce a grand unified theory that reduces free-will to causally valid, ubiquitous determinism. More than likely, as theories of free-will become closer to explaining the etiology of this entity, we will find a clear and individually applicable answer receding frustratingly into the distance. From a humanistic perspective, it is hoped that some degree of freedom will be preserved in this way. After all, the freedom to act independently and an uncertainty of the future is what makes life worth living!

When people attempt to describe their sense of self, what are they actually incorporating into the resultant definition? Personality is perhaps the most common conception of self, with vast amounts of empirical validation. However, our sense of self runs deeper than such superficial descriptions of behavioural traits. The self is an amalgamation of all that is contained within the mind; a magnificent average of every synaptic transmission and neuronal network. Like consciousness, it is an emergent phenomenon (the sum is greater than the parts). But unlike the conscious, self ceases to be when individual components are removed or modified. For example, consciousness is virtually unchanged (in the sense of what it defines – directed, controlled thought) with the removal of successive faculties. We can remove physical brain structures such as the amygdala and still utilise our capacities for consciousness, albeit loosing a portion of the informative inputs. However the self is a broader term, describing the current mental state of ‘what is’. It is both a snapshot of the descriptive, providing a broad overview of what we are at time t, and prescriptive, in that the sense of self has an influence over how behaviours are actioned and information is processed.

In this article I intend to firstly describe the basis of ‘traditional’ measures of the self; empirical measures of personality and cognition. Secondly I will provide a neuro-psychological outline of the various brain structures that could be biologically responsible for eliciting our perceptions of self. Finally, I wish to propose the view that our sense of self is dynamic, fluctuating daily based on experience and discuss how this could affect our preconceived notions of introspection.

Personality is perhaps one of the most measured variables in psychology. It is certainly one of the most well-known, through its portrayal in popular science as well as self-help psychology. Personality could also be said to comprise a major part of our sense of self, in that the way in which we respond to and process external stimuli (both physically and mentally) has major effects on who we are as an entity. Personality is also incredibly varied; whether due to genetics, environment or a combination of both. For this reason, psychological study of personality takes on a wide variety of forms.

The lexical hypothesis, proposed by Francis Galton in the 19th century, became the first stepping stone from which the field of personality psychometrics was launched. Galton’s posit was that the sum of human language, its vocabulary (lexicon), contains the necessary ingredients from which personality can be measured. During the 20th century, others expanded on this hypothesis and refined Galton’s technique through the use of Factor Analysis (a mathematical model that summarises common variance into factors). Methodological and statistical criticisms of this method aside, the lexical hypothesis proved to be useful in classifying individuals into categories of personality. However this model is purely descriptive; it simply summarises information, extracting no deeper meaning or providing background theory with which to explain the etiology of such traits. Those wishing to learn more about descriptive measures of personality can find this information under the headings ‘The Big Five Inventory’ (OCEAN) and Hans Eysencks Three Factor model (PEN).

Neuropsychological methods of defining psychology are less reliant on statistical methods and utilise a posteriori knowledge (as opposed to the lexical hypothesis which relies on reasoning/deduction). Thus, such theories have a solid empirical background with first-order experimental evidence to provide support to the conclusions reached. One such theory is the BIS/BAS (behavioural inhibition/activation system). Proposed by Gray (1982), the BIS/BAS conception of personality builds upon individual differences in cortical activity in order to arrive at the observable differences in behaviour. Such a revision of personality turns the tables on traditional methods of research in this area, moving away from superficially describing the traits to explaining the underlying causality. Experimental evidence has lent support to this model through direct observation of cortical activity (functional MRI scans). Addicts and sensation seekers are found to have high scores on behavioural activation (associated with increased per-frontal lobe activity), while introverts score high on behavioural inhibition. This seems to match up with our intuitive preconceptions of these personality groupings; sensation seekers are quick to action, in short they tend to act first and think later. Conversely, introverts act more cautiously, adhering to a policy of ‘looking before they leap’. Therefore, while not encapsulating as wide a variety of individual personality factors as the ‘Big Five’, the BIS/BAS model and others based on neurobiological foundations seem to be tapping into a more fundamental, materialistic/reductionist view of behavioural traits. The conclusion here is that directly observable events and the resulting individual differences ipso facto arise from specific regions in the brain.

Delving deeper into this neurology, the sense of self may have developed as a means to an end; the end in this case is predicting the behaviour of others. Therefore, our sense of self and consciousness may have evolved as a way of internally simulating how our social competitors think, feel and act. V. Ramachandran (M.D.), in his exclusive essay, calls upon his neurological experience and knowledge of neuroanatomy to provide a unique insight into the physiological basis of self. Mirror neurons are thought to act as mimicking simulators of external agents, in that they show activity both performing a task and while observing someone else performing the same task. It is argued that such neuronal conglomerates evolved due to social pressures; a method of second guessing the possible future actions of others. Thus, the ability to direct these networks inwards was an added bonus. The human capacity for constructing a valid theory of mind also gifted us with the ability to scrutinise the self from a meta-perspective (an almost ‘out-of-body’ experience ala a ‘Jimeny the Cricket’ style conscience).

Mirror neurons also act as empathy meters; firing across synaptic events during moments of emotional significance. In effect, our ability to recognise the feelings of others stems from a neuronal structure that actually elicits such feelings within the self. Our sense of self, thus, is inescapably intertwined with that of other agents’ self. Like it or not, biological dependence on the group has resulted in the formation of neurological triggers which fire spontaneously and without our consent. In effect, the intangible self can be influenced by other intangibles, such as emotional displays. We view the world through ‘rose coloured glasses’ with an emphasis on theorizing the actions of others through how we would respond in the same situation.

So far we have examined the role of personality in explaining a portion of what the term ‘self’ conveys. In addition, a biological basis for self has been introduced which suggests that both personality and the neurological capacity for introspection are both anatomically definable features of the brain. But what else are we referring to when we speak of having a sense of self? Surely we are not doing this construct justice if all that it contains is differences in behavioural disposition and anatomical structure.

Indeed, the sense of self is dynamic. Informational inputs constantly modify and update our knowledge banks, which in turn, have ramifications for self. Intelligence, emotional lability, preferences, group identity, proprioreception (spatial awareness); the list is endless. Although some of these categories of self may be collapsible into higher order factors (personality could incorporate preference and group behaviour), it is arguable that to do so would result in the loss of information. The point here is that to look at the bigger picture may obscure the finer details that can lead to further enlightenment on what we truly mean when we discuss self.

Are you the same person you were 10 years ago? In most cases, if not all, the answer will be no. Core traits may remain relatively stable, such as temperament, however arguably, individuals change and grow over time. Thus, their sense of self changes as well, some people may become more attuned to their sense of self than others, developing a close relationship through introspective analysis. Others, sadly, seem to lack this ability of meta-cognition; thinking about thinking, asking the questions of ‘why’, ‘who am I’ and ‘how did I come to be’. I believe this has implications for the growth of humanity as a species.

Is a state of societal eudaimonia sustainable in a population that has varying levels of ‘selfness’? If self is linked to the ability to simulate the minds of others, which is also dependent upon both neurological structure (leading to genetic mutation possibly reducing or modifying such capacities) and empathic responses, the answer to this question is a resounding no. Whether due to nature or nurture, society will always have individuals whom are more self-aware than others, and as a result, more attentive and aware of the mental states of others. A lack of compassion for the welfare of others coupled with an inability to analyse the self with any semblance of drive and purpose spells doom for a harmonious society. Individuals lacking in self will refuse, through ignorance, to grow and become socially aware.

Perhaps collectivism is the answer; forcing groups to co-habitate may introduce an increased appreciation for theory of mind. If the basis of this process is mainly biological (as it would seem to be), such a policy would be social suicide. The answer could dwell in the education system. Introducing children to the mental pleasures of psychology and at a deeper level, philosophy, may result in the recognisation of the importance of self-reflection. The question here is not only whether students will grasp these concepts with any enthusiasm, but also if such traits can be taught via traditional methods. More research must be conducted into the nature of the self if we are to have an answer to this quandry. Is self related directly to biology (we are stuck with what we have) or can it be instilled via psycho-education and a modification of environment?

Self will always remain a mystery due to its dynamic and varied nature. It is with hope that we look to science and encourage its attempts to pin down the details on this elusive subject. Even if this quest fails to produce a universal theory of self, perhaps it will be successful in shedding at least some light onto the murky waters of self-awareness. In doing so, psychology stands to benefit both from a philosophical and a clinical perspective, increasing our knowledge of the causality underlying disorders of the self (body dysmorphia, depression/suicide, self-harming) .

If you haven’t already done so, take a moment now to begin your journey of self discovery; you might just find something you never knew was there!

Most of us would like to think that we are independent agents that are in control of our destiny. After all, free-will is one of the unique phenomena that humanity can claim as its own – a fundamental part of our cognitive toolkit. Experimental evidence, in the form of neurological imaging has been interpreted as an attack on mental freedom. Studies that highlight the possibility of unconscious activity preceding the conscious ‘will to act’ seem to almost sink the arguments from non-determinists (libertarians). In this article I plan to outline this controversial research and offer an alternative interpretation; one which does not infringe on our abilities to act independent and of our own accord. I would then like to explore some of the situations where free-will could be ‘missing in action’ and suggest that the frequency at which this occurs is larger than expected.

A seminal investigation conducted by Libet et al (1983) first challenged (empirically) our preconceived notions of free-will. The setup consisted of an electroencephalograph (EEG, measuring overall electrical potentials through the scalp) connected to the subject and a large clock with markings denoting various time periods. Subjects were required to simply flick their wrist whenever a feeling urged them to do so. The researchers were particularly interested in the “Bereitschaftspotential” or readiness potential; a signature EEG pattern of activity that signals the beginning of volitional initiation of movement. Put simply, the RP is an measurable spike in electrical activity from the pre-motor region of the cerebral cortex – a mental preparatory action that put the wheels of movement into action.

Results of this experiment indicated that the RP significantly preceded the subjects’ reported sensations of conscious awareness. That is, the act of wrist flicking seemed to precede conscious awareness of said act. While the actual delay between RP detection and conscious registration of intent to move was small (by our standards), the half a second gap was more than enough to assert that a measurable difference had occurred. Libet interpreted these findings as having vast implications for free-will. It was argued that since electrical activity preceded conscious awareness of the intent to move, free-will to initiate movement (Libet allowed free-will to control movements already in progress, that is, modify their path or act as a final ‘veto’ in allowing or disallowing it to occur) was non-existent.

Many have taken the time to respond to Libet’s initial experiment. Daniel Dennet (in his book Freedom Evolves) provides an apt summary of the main criticisms. The most salient rebuttal comes in the form of signal delay. Consciousness is notoriously slow in comparison to the automated mental processes that act behind the scenes. Take the sensation of pain, for example. Initial stimulation of the nerve cells must firstly reach sufficient levels for an action potential to fire, causing dendrites to flood ions into the synaptic gap. The second-order neuron then receives these chemical messengers, modifying its electrical charge and causing another action potential to fire along its myelinated axon. Now, taking into account the length that this signal must travel (at anywhere from 1-10m/s), it will then arrive at the thalamus, the brain’s sensory ‘hub’ where it is then routed to consciousness. Consequently, there is a measurable gap between the external event and conscious awareness; perhaps made even larger if the signal is small (low pain) or the mind is distracted. In this instance, electrical activity is also taking place and preceding consciousness. Arguably the same phenomenon could be occurring in the Libet experiment.

Delays are inevitably introduced when consciousness is involved in the equation. The brain is composed of a conglomerate of specialised compartments, each communicating with its neighbours and performing its own part of the process in turn. Evolution has drafted brains that act automatic first, and conscious second. Consequently, the automatic gains priority over the directed. Reflexes and instincts act to save our skins long before we are even aware of the problem. Naturally, electrical activity in the brain could thus precede conscious awareness.

In the Libet experiment, the experimental design itself could be misleading. Libet seems to equate his manipulation of consciousness timing with free-will, when in actual fact, the agent has already decided freely that they will follow instructions. What I am trying to say here is that free-will does not have to act as an initiator to every movement; rather it acts to ‘set the stage’ for events and authorises the operation to go ahead. When told to move voluntarily, the agent’s will makes the decision to either comply or rebel. Compliance causes the agent to authorise movement, but the specifics are left up to chance. Perhaps a random input generator (quantum indeterminacy?) provides the catalyst with which this initial order combines to create the RP and eventual movement. Conscious registration of this fact only occurs once the RP is already starting to form.

Looking at things from this perspective, consciousness seems to play a constant game of ‘catch-up’ with the automated processes in our brains. Our will is content to act as a global authority, leaving the more menial and mundane tasks up to our brain’s automated sub-compartments. Therefore, free-will is very much alive and kicking, albeit sometimes taking a back-seat to the unconscious.

We have begun by exploring the nature of free-will and how it links in with consciousness. But what of these unconscious instincts that seek to override our sense of direction and seek to regress humanity back to its more animalistic and primitive ancestry? Such instincts act covertly; sneakily acting whilst our will is otherwise indisposed. Left unabated, the agent that gives themselves completely to urges and evolutionary drives could be said to be devoid of free-will, or at the very least, somewhat lacking compared to more ‘aware’ individuals. Take sexual arousal, for instance. Like it or not, our bodies act on impulse, removing free-will from the equation with simplistic stimulus:response conditioning processes. Try as we might, sexual arousal (if allowed to follow its course) acts immediately upon visual or physical stimulation. It is only when the consciousness kicks into gear and yanks on the leash attached to our unconscious that control is regained. Eventually, with enough training, it may be possible to override these primitive responses, but the conscious effort required to sustain such a project would be psychically draining.

Society also seeks to rob us of our free-will. People are pushed and pulled by group norms, expectations of others and the messages that are constantly bombarding us on a daily basis. Rather than encouraging individualism, modern society is instead urging us to follow trends. Advertising is crafted in a way that the individual may even be fooled into thinking that they are arriving at decisions of their own volition (subliminal messaging), when in actual fact, it is simply tapping into some basic human need for survival (food, sex, shelter/security etc).

Ironically, science itself could also be said to be reducing the amount of free-will we can exert. Scientific progress seeks to make the world deterministic; that is, totally predictable through increasingly accurate theories. While the jury is still out as to whether ‘ultimate’ accuracy in prediction will ever occur (arguably, there is not enough bits of information in the universe with which to construct a computer powerful enough to complete such a task) science is coming closer to a deterministic framework whereby the paths of individual particles can be predicted. Quantum physics is but the next hurdle to be overcome in this quest for omniscience. If the inherent randomness that lies within quantum processes is ever fully explained, perhaps we will be at a place (at least scientifically) to model a individual’s future action based on a number of initial variables.

What could this mean for the nature of free-will? If past experiments are anything to go by (Libet et al), it will rock our sense of self to the core. Are we but behaviouristic automatons as the psychologist Skinner proposed? Delving deeper into the world of the quanta, will we ever be able to realistically model and predict the paths of individual particles and thus the future course of the entire system? Perhaps the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle will spare us from this bleak fate. The indivisible randomness of the quantum wave function could potentially be the final insurmountable obstacle that neurological researchers and philosophers alike will never be able to conquer.

While I am all for scientific progress and increasing the bulk of human knowledge, perhaps we are jumping the gun with this free-will stuff. Perhaps some things are better left mysterious and unexplained. A defeatist attitude if ever I saw one, but it could be justified. After all, how would you feel if you knew every action was decided before you were even a twinkle in your father’s eye? Would life even be worth living? Sure, but it would take alot of reflection and a personality that could either deny or reconcile the feelings of unease that such a proposition brings.

They were right; ignorance really is bliss.

Compartmentalisation of consciousness