The topic of free-will is one of the largest problems facing modern philosophers. An increasing empirical onslaught has done little to alleviate these murky waters. In actuality, each scientific breakthrough has resulted in greater philosophical confusion, whether it be due to an impractical knowledge base that is needed to interpret these results or counter-intuitive outcomes (RP signal, brain activity precedes conscious action). My own attempts to shed some light onto this matter are equally feeble, which has precipated the creation of the present article. What is the causal nature of the universe? Is each action determined and directly predictable from a sufficiently detailed starting point or is there a degree of inherent uncertainty? How can we reconcile the observation that free-will appears to be a valid characteristic of humanity with mounting scientific evidence to the contrary (eg Grand Unified Theory)? These are the questions I would like to discuss.
‘Emergent’ seems to be the latest buzzword in popular science. While the word is appealing when describing how complexity can arise from relatively humble beginnings, it does very little to actually explain the underlying process. These two states are simply presented on a platter, the lining of which is composed of fanciful ‘emergent’ conjourings. While there is an underlying science behind the process involving dynamic systems (modelled on biological growth and movement), there does seem to be an element of hand waving and mystique.
This state of affairs does nothing to help current philosophical floundering. Intuitively, free-will is an attractive feature of the universe. People feel comfortable knowing that they have a degree of control over the course of their life. A loss of such control could even be construed as a faciliator of mental illness (depression, bipolar disorder). Therefore, the attempts of science to develop a unified theory of complete causal prediction seems to undermine our very nature as human beings. Certainly, some would embrace the notion of a deterministic universe with open arms, happy to put uncertainty to an end. However, one would do well (from a Eudamonic point of view) to cognitively reframe anxiety regarding the future to an expectation of suprise and anticipation at the unknown.
While humanity is firmly divided over their preference for a predictable or uncertain universe, the problem remains that we appear to have a causally determined universe with individual freedom of choice and action. Quantum theory has undermined determinism and causality to an extent, with the phenomenon of spontaneous vaccuum energy supporting the possibility of events occuring without any obvious cause. Such evidence is snapped up happily by proponents of free-will with little regard as to its real-world plausibility.This is another example of philosophical hand-waving, where the real problem involves a form of question begging; that is, a circular argument with the premise requiring a proof of itself in order to remain valid! For example, the following argument is often used;
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Assume quantum fluctuations really are indeterminate in nature (underlying causality ala ‘String Theory’ not applicable).
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Free-will requires indeterminacy as a physical prerequisite.
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Quantum fluctuations are responsible for free-will.
To give credit where it is due, the actual arguments used are more defined than that which is outlined above, however the basic structure is similar. Basic premises can be outlined and postulates put forward describing the possible form of neurological free will, however as with most developing fields the supporting evidence is skimp at best. And to make matters worse, quantum theory has shown that human intuition is often not the best method of attempting an explaination.
However, if we work with what we have, perhaps something useful will result. This includes such informal accounts such as anecdotal evidence. The consideration of such evidence has led to the creation of two ‘maxims’ that seem to summarise the evidence presented in regards to determinsm and free-will.
Maxim one. The degree of determinism within a system is reliant upon the scale of measurement; a macro form of measurement results in a predominantly deterministic outcome, while a micro form of measurement results in an outcome that is predominantly ‘free’ or unpredictable. What this is saying is that determinism and freedom can be directly reconciled and coexist within the same construct of reality. Rather than existing as two distinctly separate entities, these universal characteristics should be reconceptualised as two extremities on a sliding scale of some fundamental quality. Akin to Einstein’s General Relativity, the notions of determinism and freedom are also relative to the observer. In other words, how we examine the fabric of reality (large or small scale) results in a worldview that is either free or constrained by predictability. Specifically, quantum scale measurements allow for an indeterministic universe, while larger scale phenomenon are increasingly easier to predict (with a corresponding decrease in the accuracy in the measurement tool). In short, determinism (or free-will) is not a physical property of the universe, but a characteristic of perception and an artifact of the mesaurement method used. While this maxim seems commonsensical and almost obvious, I believe the idea that both determinism and free-will are reconcilable features of this universe is a valid proposition that warrants further investigation.
Maxim Two: Indeterminacy and free-will are naturally occuring results that emerge from the complex interaction of a sufficient number of interacting deterministic systems (actual mechanisms unknown). Once again we are falling back on the explanatory scapegoat of ‘emergence’, however its use is partially justified (in the light of empirical developments). For example, investigations into fractal patterns and the modelling of chaotic systems seems to justify the existence of emergent complexity. Fractals are generated from a finite set of definable equations and result in an intensely complicated geometric figure with infinite regress, the surface features undulating with each magnification (interestingly, fractal patterns are a naturally occuring feature in the physical world, and can result from biological growth patterns and magnetic field lines). Chaos is a similar phenomemon, beginning from reasonably humble initial circumstances, and due to an amalgamation of interferring variables results in an overall system of indeterminacy and unpredictability (eg weather patterns). Perhaps this is the mechanism of human consciousness of freedom of will; individual (and deterministic) neurons contribute enmasse to an overall emergent system that is unpredictable. As a side note, such a position also supports the possibility of artificial intelligence; build something that is sufficiently complex and ‘human-like’ consciousness and freedom will result.
The two maxims proposed may seem to be quite obvious on cursory inspection, however it can be argued that the proposal of a universe in which determinism and freedom of will form two alternative interpretations of a common, underlying reality is unique. Philisophically, the topic is difficult to investigate and discuss due to limitations on empirical knowledge and an increasing requirement for specialised technical insight into the field.
The ultimate goal of modern empiricism is to reduce reality to a strictly deterministic foundation. In keeping with this aim, experimentation hopes to arrive at physical laws of nature that are increasingly accurate and versatile in their generality. Quantum theory has since put this inexorable march on hold while futile attempts are made to circumvent the obstacle that is the uncertainty principle.
Yet perhaps there is a light at the end of the tunnel, however dim the journey may be. Science may yet produce a grand unified theory that reduces free-will to causally valid, ubiquitous determinism. More than likely, as theories of free-will become closer to explaining the etiology of this entity, we will find a clear and individually applicable answer receding frustratingly into the distance. From a humanistic perspective, it is hoped that some degree of freedom will be preserved in this way. After all, the freedom to act independently and an uncertainty of the future is what makes life worth living!
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12 February, 2008 at 4:05 pm
Jonathan Clark
wow..that’s a lengthy way of saying “we have no idea”
Those who propose “free-will” need to explain why they have no say in the date of their obituary
12 February, 2008 at 10:11 pm
vulcanis
In response, I would say that free-will is a description of conscious activity, a base method of facilitating self-directed thought. From here we have the external, observable ability of physical action, which I believe some people class as a first-order example of free-will in action. In reality, free-will is our ability to generate thoughts internally, which can (but not necessarily) lead to observable actions. Therefore while people appear to be predictable on the surface (social conformity, morality, use of normative behaviours), their internal mental states are not (preserving freedom of will).
Free-will does not apply to something such as death; arguably we have increased the lifespan of humanity through advances in medical technology, there is also some evidence that living a positive, happy and stress-free life extends the lifespan. I am not sure how you can rationally equate an unconscious, automatic biological activity that has little to no connection (with the exception of the ‘placebo effect’) with the mind (source of free-will). I am sure that further research needs to be conducted into the use of postive affirmation and the resultant effects on physical (and mental) health. In this case, directed, willed behaviour results in a net benefit to the individual (thus refuting your statement that we have no control over our deaths). Likewise, if the determinist’s view is correct, why can’t you predict the date of your own death? There is a measure of uncertainty, you could die next week for all you know. Surely this inherent uncertainty is a least sufficient for the existence of free-will (with the counter claim that having an infinite knowledge of starting conditions and infinite computing power results in perfect predictability).
I think you need to revise your definition of free-will; it is not a magical ‘making your wishes come true’ phenomenon. Rather, it is a humanistic appreciation that humanity has control over their actions, and accepts responsibility for their actions rather than blaming a never-ending regress of causality. The aim of my article was not to say ‘we dont know’ but rather to propose that determinism and free-will are both a part of the same universal construct; they are merely an artifact of our measurements and depend upon the questions that are being asked. We measure the motion of the planets around the sun in terms of deterministic principles; they follow roughly the same paths according to our laws of motion. But is this simply because of our preconceptions surrounding masses of rock? Arguably, the closer we look the less deterministic the motion becomes. The orbit may wobble or vary a little according to gravitational disturbances and such-like. It is only because such a measurement is impractical that we rarely engage in it.
The problem with humanity is that the measurement method is ambiguous. At the macro level we have groups of people conforming to rough and ready rules of engagement. Statistical measures are employed to average the activities of large groups and arrive at some sort of deterministic outlook. Individually, we seem to have the ability to control our own actions. The opponents to this could simply be giving in to intrinsic human nature, that is, the ‘easy way out’ where all actions are the direct result of some prior cause. This may be the case, but we do have the ability do otherwise; the proof of this still eluding our best efforts to capture it. I believe it is only a matter or time before science and society as a whole, is forced to restructure worldly beliefs and accept that uncertainty is simply part and parcel of reality.
13 February, 2008 at 4:23 pm
Dennis Quine
V:
Methinks we went over some of these questions a few weeks ago. I think most of my earlier observations are still alive on your site, so I won’t waste time repeating them.
But how about a new take on the question of what we mean by “determinism”? There are three general frameworks we employ in the sciences and engineering: deterministic, chaotic, and probabilistic. Each framework is needed to address different aspects of physical phenomena.
A deterministic phenomenon is predictable using some set of equations that we have derived (empirically of from first principles) to describe the future behavior of the phenomenon. E.g., the phases of the moon are predictable for years into the future because we have a theory (Newtonian gravitation) that describes the motion of the moon around the earth sufficently accurately to make the predictions.
A chaotic phenomenon is also deterministic: we have a set of dynamic equations (i.e., equations that predict the future state of the system); however, because of the physical limitations of our computers (finite word length), errors crop up in future predictions that are impossible to correct. Thus, the weather two weeks hence is (in principle) predictable using the equations for behavior of a fluid on a rotating sphere, but in practivce, we have only patchy information about the initial condidtions, and cannot carry infinite precision numbers in our calculations.
Thus, we are unable to initiate the calculation of future conditions with inifinitly accurate specification of the current condition of the atmosphere (e.g., the “butterfly” phenomenon). And, not only are the initial conditions in error, but any realizable computer has a finite word length, so further errors start compounding. This is called “chaos” in dynamic systems theory. But note that it is a characteristic of limitations in our means of prediction. The world is perfectly capable of doing the requisite calculations (and will do them to create the weather a month from now). But we with our finite net of observing sensors and finite computers cannot do the calculations for a month from now. So we get out about 7-10 days, and then predictions begin to collapse. Is the weather deterministic? As best we can figure, yes. Is it predictable: only for a short time into the future.
Finally, we have probabilistic phenomena, which appear to come in two varieties. In type one, such as the throw of a die or a coin, the phenomenon is deterministic, but in practice is unpredictable because of computational limitations. These phenomena are truly deterministic, although for practical purposes, we cannot predict ahead of time the outcome of the event. This is demonstrated by the fact that some magicians have mastered the art of throwing dice and coins so that they can get repeated “heads” time after time with a “fair” coin. But for most of us, we have to describe the outcomes with probability numbers, not with Newton’s equations of dynamics.
The second type of probabilistic phenomenon is what we observe in quantum phenomenon. Here it is postulated that it is trully impossible, even in principle, to predict some future quantum event, such as when a single radioactive atom might “decide” to decay. We have only a probabilistic description: a certain percentage of the atoms in a sample will decay over a period of time; no prediction of when any specific atom will decay appears to be possible. Note the difference between this and the coins/dice situation where in principle we think we could predict the outcome of an event, if we had all the information needed (initial throwing conditions, air motions, surface roughness for bounces, etc.). For quantum events, this “in principle” calculation does not appear to be possible.
This is the genesis of the decades-long debate between Bohr and Einstein. Einstein thought that quantum mechanics was incomplete: that there was a more complete, deterministic theory, underlying quantum phenomemena that would ultimately remove the probabilistic models that were being used. Bohr held that the quantum regime was truly the empire of random events. So far, Bohr seems to be ahead on points.
The issue I would like to surface here is the role of the difference between “Determinism” and “Predictability”. We generally take evidence of the latter to imply the former: if we know enough about a phenomenon to predict it arbitrarily far into the future, we infer that it it is deterministic. But the implication arrow does not seem to work from determinism to predictability. We have both the example of deterministic chaos that is unpredictable, and deterministic coin throwing that is (for most of us) unpredictable.
Trying to argue by analogy to human conditions, one could entertain the hypothesis that our behavior is, indeed, “determined”, but still could be “non-predictable”, either in the short-term (e.g., coin flipping) or long-term (chaotic evolution of the system). Then there is the Penrose hypothesis, namely, that people really are quantum unpredicatable, and not just unpredictable in practice; e.g., “chaotic”.
Now, I wonder if we could tell, subjectively, whether our decisions and actions are deterministic but unpredictable in practice (like the coin flip), or inherently unpredectable because of quantum-like indeterminism?
Happy conundum-busting,
DHQ
13 February, 2008 at 9:12 pm
Dennis Quine
V:
I meant conundrum, of course (with an “r”). Typos do get thru even with proof reading.
Further thought: if we argue that we are deterministic systems (even though our future activities are unpredictable in practice), then the next inference is that free will is an illusion. It is simply our lack of computational capability, inadequate data on initial conditions, etc., that prevents us from demonstrating that humans are as predictable as robots, if we only knew enough (like the coin flipping example).
None of us much want to live that way, but unless the Penrosian hypothesis can be sustantiated, we may have to acknowledge the fact that poeple are as programmed and predictable as machines, if only we had several orders of magnitude improvement in our computers and data files to model individual behavior.
By the way, I don’t think this is what Hari Seldon proposes. Psychohistory assumes that individuals are still basically unpredictable, but that statistical ensembles (like societies) can be predictable. Relates back to our conversation about social history and the inevitability of collapse into dark ages.
DHQ
13 February, 2008 at 10:55 pm
vulcanis
Hi DHQ,
Yes, your last point rings true regarding the psychohistory of Hari Seldon. I guess this is a similar proposition to what I was outlining in the main section of the article, that being the scale of the prediction/measurement influences the likelihood of prediction. Individuals are hard/impossible to predict whilst groups are (on average) predictable. This is outlined in a book I am currently reading (Critical Mass by Philip Ball), where the physical gas and phase transition laws (such as critical points where matter reorganises its structure eg freezing) are applied to society. What results is a fairly accurate model of human activity, whether it be traffic flow or crowd movements. The contraint here, however (which I agree with), is that the finer the measurement, the greater the uncertainty. Sure, you can develop an overall model of brain activity, and say ‘given X stimulus we will see brain activity in Y areas of the frontal lobe’ however individual neuron activity and specific thought patterns will remain elusive. There will always be an element of uncertainty, which I equate to a sufficient condition for free-will. Granted, this line of argument needs serious clarification and substantiation but it is a strictly personal intuition.
I am not so convinced of the argument that ‘given infinite computing power we can predict anything’. It seems a little ‘what if’ to say the least. However, I see the basis of the argument; is the universe inherently predictable given enough time and energy to run the simulation accurately? I believe my objection comes from a deeply personal appreciation of freedom, and a belief that we are more than mere automatons responding to stimuli. Of course, there is a very large degree of this automation that does occur (conformity, personality, inter-personal control) which sees out freedom taken away on a daily basis. But I do think that beneath all of that there is an ‘enigma machine’ of sorts, one that is capable of doing otherwise and exerting control over their destiny.
I enjoyed your clarification of predictability, determinism and probability. Reading over it again has shaken my firm belief that free-will is a certainty. It could very well be that in the future we will discover an underlying theory that restores determinism; what will this mean to our nature as human beings? Will we be liberated or will life continue as is, the practicalities of actually running individual-based simulations falling far short of what we would require to make it a useful tool? Although I am comforted by current directions in quantum theory, namely that there does seem to be a physical limitation on the fundamental level of determinacy. Whether this quantum randomness is actually scalable and influential on the macro level of human brain activity remains to be seen.
14 February, 2008 at 3:22 pm
Dennis Quine
V:
Ball’s book is excellent. I’ve used some of those illustrations in my course on the “Dynamics of Metasystems” in discussing the predictability of large-scale systems and emergent behavior.
I don’t think anyone is ready to give up the idea of personal free will, in spite of the difficulty of sustaining it in the face of progress in neuroscience, et al. It’s like Descartes’ dualism: we feel like “we” (made of mind stuff) are in here looking out on the world, in spite of the growing evidence that the sense of ego is just an emergent property of millions of neurons firing away. Our way of dealing with each other as persons would pretty well collapse if we had to give up thinking we each had a mind, were spiritual beings, and had freedom to decide and act. It may be an illusion, but it is what makes civilized life possible.
If I am just an extremely sophisticated robot lumbering around, and can’t exceed the limits of my genetic programming and early training, I can’t really be held accountable for my actions (well, isn’t that the excuse some law-breakers use already? They all blame a poor childhood or a mean father for their “acting out” as adults). In the meantime, while the program of neuroscience works itself out, we continue to live in the illusion of freedom.
It is easy to imagine future societies where that assumption is not made, and we are treated more like well-programmed ants living in our ant-hills. Helstrom wrote a book about that three decades ago called “The Hive” that assumed the human species divided, and some people went off to live as totally communal animals just driven by their programming. I think he was interested in exploring the implications of B.F. Skinner’s ideas in a novel. Skinner’s book “Walden Two” was a similar portrayal of a society where people were assumed to be pretty dumb animals and instrumental conditioning was consistently used to control behavior. Read it decades ago in college, but all I remember is I thought it was pathetic.
Trouble is, as portrayed in the Helstrom book, the “hive” people actually had several advantages in the biological competition and ultimately conquer earth, driving the believers in the illusion of free will to extinction. Pretty gruesome view of things.
I’ll take my illusions, as long as I can get away with it.
DHQ