Teleportation is no longer banished to the realm of science fiction. It is widely accepted that what was once considered a physical impossibility is now directly achievable through quantum manipulations of individual particles. While the methods involved are still in their infancy (single electrons are the heaviest particle to be teleported), we can at least begin to appreciate and think about the possibilities on the basis of plausibility. Specifically, what are the implications for personal identity if this method of transportation is possible on a human scale? Atomically destructing and reconstructing an individual at an alternate location could introduce problems with consciousness. Is this the same person or simply an identical twin with its own thoughts, feelings and desires? These are the questions I would like to discuss in this article.
Biologically we lose our bodies several times over during one human life-time. Complete organs are replaced diurnally with little thought given to the implications for self-identity. It is a phenomenon that is often overlooked, and especially so in relation to recent empirical developments with quantum teleportation. If we are biologically replaced with regularity does this imply that our sense of self is, likewise, dynamic in nature and constantly evolving? There would be reasonable arguements for both sides of this debate; maturity and daily experience do result in a varied mental environment. However, one wonders if this has more to do with innate processes such as information transfer/recollection/modification rather than purely the biological characteristics of individual cells (in relation to cell division and rejuvenation processes).
Thus it could be argued that identity is a largely conscious (in terms of seeking out information and creating internal schema of identity) and directed process. This does not totally rule out the potential for identity based upon changes to biological structure. Perhaps the effects are more subtle, modifying our identities in such a way as to facilitate maturity or even mental illness (if the duplication process is disturbed). Cell mutation (neurological tumor growth) is one such example whereby a malfunctioning biological process can result in direct and often drastic changes to identity.
However, I believe it is safe to assume that “normal” tissue regenerative processes do not result in any measurable changes to identity. What makes teleportation so different? Quantum teleportation has been used to teleport photons from one location to another, and more recently, particles with mass (electrons). The process is decidedly less romantic than science-fiction authors would have us believe; classical transmission of information is still required, and a receiving station must still be established at the desired destination. What this means is that matter transportation, ala ‘Star Trek’ transporters, is still very much an unforeseeable fiction. In addition, something as complex as the human body would require incredible computing power to scan at sufficient detail, another limiting factor in its practicality. Fortunately, there are potential uses for this technology such as in the fledging industry of quantum computers.
The process works around the limitations of the quantum Uncertainty Principle (which states that the exact properties of a quantum system can never be known in exact detail) through a process known as the “Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen” effect. Einstein had real issues with Quantum Mechanics; he didn’t like it at all (to quote the cliche ‘Spooky action at a distance’). The EPR paper was aimed at irrefutably proving the implausibility of entangled pairs of quantum particles. John Stewart Bell tripped the Einstein proposition on its head when he demonstrated that entangled particles do in fact exhibit statistically significant random behaviours (that is, the frequencies of each action correlated between both particles too highly to be due to chance alone). The fact that entanglement does not violate the no-communication theorem is good news for our assumptions regarding reality, but more bad news for teleportation fans. Information regarding the quantum state of the teleportee is still required to be transmitted via conventional methods for reassembly at the other end.
Quantum teleportation works by initially scanning the quantum state of a particle at A, with care taken not to cause too much disruption (measurement distorts the original, the harder you look the more uncertain the result). This partial scan is then transmitted at relativistic speeds to the receiver at B. A pair of entangled particles is then dispatched to both teleportation stations. Entangled particle 1 at A interacts with the remainder of A (minus the scanned out information sent to B). Entanglement then assures that this information will be instantaneously available at B (via entangled particle 2). Utilising the principles of the EPR effect and Bell’s statistical correlations, it is then possible to reconstruct the state of the original particle A at the distant location, B. While the exact mechanism is beyond the technical capacity of philosophy, it is prudent to say that the process works by taking the entangled information from EP2 and combining it with the classically transmitted information that was scanned out of the original particle, A.
Casting practicality aside for the sake of philosophical discussion, if such a process became possible for a being as complex as a human, what would be the implications for consciousness and identity? Common sense tells us that if an exact replica could be duplicated then how is this in any way different to the original? One would simply ‘wake-up’ at the new location within the same body and mind as you left. Those that subscribe to a Cartesian view of separated body and mind would look upon teleportation with an abhorrent revulsion. Surely along the way we are loosing a part of what makes us uniquely human; some sort of intangible soul or essence of mind which cannot be reproduced? This leads one to similar thought experiments. What if another being somewhere in the Universe is born with the exact mental characteristics as yourself? Would this predispose them to some sort of underlying and phenomenological connection? Perhaps this is supported by anecdotal evidence from empirical studies into identical twins. It is thought such individuals share a common bond, demonstrating almost telepathic abilities at times. Although it could be argued that the nature of this mechanism is probably no more mystical than a familiar acquaintance predicting how you would react in a given situation, or similarities in brain structure predisposing twins to ‘higher than average’ mental convergence events.
Quantum teleportation on conscious beings also raises serious moral implications. Is it considered murder to deconstruct the individual at point A, or is this initial crime nullified once the reassembly is completed? Is it still considered immoral if someone else appears at the receiver due to error or quantum fluctuation? Others may argue that it is no different to conventional modes of transport; human error should be dealt as such (necessary condition for the label of crime/immorality) and naturally occurring disasters interpreted as nothing more than random events.
While it is doubtful that we will ever see teleportation on a macro scale, we should remain mindful of the philosophical and practical implications of emerging technologies. Empirical forces are occasionally blinded to these factors when such innovations are announced to the general public. While it is an important step in society that such processes are allowed to continue, the rate at which they are appearing can be cause for alarm if they impinge upon our human rights and the preservation of individuality. There has never been a more pressing time for philosophers to think about the issues and offer their wisdom to the world.
10 comments
Comments feed for this article
30 January, 2008 at 10:51 pm
Dennis Quine
V:
Interesting essay, with a number of openings that can stimulate further discussion. A few that caught my attention follow.
Quantum communications:
Charles Stross (former computer scientist turned science fiction writer) uses quantum entanglement to achieve clandestine, instantaneous communications for his secret agent in his novel “Singularity Sky”. He postulates the entangled states can be “frozen” and kept in some kind of storage device indefinitely. Then one half of the material can be physically taken to another location (in Singularity Sky, it is carried on subluminal ships to interstellar locations). But once there, the entangled somethings can be used to transmit messages over interstellar distances in zero time. ‘Course, it took you decades to get there on your old Model T space ship, but once there, the communications are pretty fast.
Once used, of course, the bit represented by a single entangled electron (or whatever) is no longer useful again, so there is only a finite amount of message generating material in the little storage box. Short, concise messages are the rule. I think Stross does a pretty good job of describing how something like this might actually have to work, in a relativistically-constrained universe.
Quantum transportation:
Lawrence Krauss (PhD physicist and author of “The Physics of Star Trek” devotes a whole chapter to the Star Trek transporter in that book. He argues there are three possible ways the thing could work, and runs some numbers to illustrate how improbable any of the three are.
The first way is to build a mini warp through space to the location desired, and transmit the entire body, without taking it apart. This would seem to require a receiver on the other end, which does not appear in any of the ST shows, except where they are transmitting between ship and civilized locations. The transporter only seems to need machinery on one end, given the unimproved sites they visit.
The second way is to disassemble the entire object being transmitted, and squirt each atom off to the new location, where it is reassembled. Once again, it would seem that machinery on both ends is needed, and also, one is now sending both the atoms of the object, and the information about how they are to be reassembled. Sending the atoms as well as the information solves one problem: if you only send information (option 3 below), where do you get the trace elements you need to reassemble a human? I.e., suppose we transport down to a desert location. Plenty of silicon and oxygen around, but where do we get the iron to reconstitute hemoglobin, or the hydrogen so we can make water (in the desert?) of which the body is 80-90%? Also, “Beam me up Scotty”: so where is the disassembler if we are on an unimproved planet?
Option three is the one you broached: scan the body, and generate an instantaneous data base concerning where each atom is, what it is connected up with, energy states, etc. Then just send the information to the new site, where a body can be reassembled out of local materials. Problem with that is same as before: you probably need a machine on both ends. And a lot of jugs of free atoms sitting around to be used in the reassembly. Aside from the uncertainty issues (well, Star Trek does use Heisenberg Compensators, however they work), the scanning process and communications loading are off the scale high by present and any foreseeable future standards. Krause does the numbers, but I’ve misplaced my copy, so can’t recall what they were. The transporter is, however, only used for local (ship-ship and ship –shore) transportation, so at least we don’t have to contend with relativistic violations. Small comfort, given all the other technical challenges.
Other teleportation schemes
Best scheme for a matter transmitter I can recall reading about was a short story years ago where the system was set up all around the planet. Replaces trains, buses, cars, everything. So, near-instantaneous transportation point-point was possible through this magic grid. Analogous to the phone system, only for material bodies. You could have a portal in your home and dial in a number, step through the portal, and -squirt –there you are. Solves the machine on both ends conundrum, that’s the way it was designed to work.
Story was about cops trying to catch a thief/murderer who kept squirting around and never stopped someplace long enough for them to respond in local real space. Good story, technology worked out well as I recall, but can’t remember the author. Larry Niven also uses “stepping discs” in his “Ringworld” series, but doesn’t explain how they work. It’s alien technology anyway, left by whoever built the Ringworld.
Speaking of aliens, there are hundreds of reports over decades of flying saucers apparently materializing near witnesses, and also disappearing rapidly. They do not appear to just fly away, like a plane, but to disappear through some other dimensional “window in reality”. So, wonder what technology they are using (?). Mini space warps (Krauss’ option 1), I guess.
There is a collection of material dealing with teleportation available on “Teleportation Physics Study”, a CD available thru Amazon. Collection of material relating to the US Air Force Research Lab study conducted a couple of years ago. Copy of the report plus a lot of supporting papers on that CD. There is also the book by Darling: “Teleportation: The Impossible Leap”, just out a couple of years ago. A little heavy on the history of physics, but still a serious discussion without a lot of the technical gobbledygook. Darling is a believer, unlike Krause.
Running kind of long here, so will come back later and contribute a few thoughts on the “personal identity” paradoxes you raise in the essay.
“Crazy way to travel – spreading a man’s molecules all over the universe” – Dr McCoy
Hang in there,
DHQ
31 January, 2008 at 3:25 am
vulcanis
Hello DHQ,
I do think that we will be seeing this technique employed in cryptographic applications to begin with, possibly within the next 10 years or so. From there I believe Quantum Comptuers will enter the fray, providing the means with which to continue (an equivalence of) Moore’s Law of transistor doubling every 18 months. “Singularity Sky” sounds like an interesting read, its not often that authors attempt to explain their plot devices in terms of a grounding in theoretical, real-world physics. I remember as a child reading the other book you mention ‘The physics (and metaphysics) of Star Trek’.
I was surprised at your reference to UFOs, another of my childhood quirks was an (unhealthy) obsession with this subject following my first viewing of ‘War of the Worlds’. While my enthusiasm has waned somewhat, I do think it is at least a possibility that they do exist. Albeit, I have learnt that human imagination is often our own worst enemy when seeking objective truth. I guess it is a little like Agent Mulder’s poster of a UFO; ‘I Want To Believe’!
I am eagerly awaiting your identity comments.
Regards,
Tristan
31 January, 2008 at 4:32 pm
Dennis Quine
V:
Some further thoughts prompted by your essay on quantum teleportation, et al
The Nature of Personal Identity
We all go thru this period of “who am I” as teenagers, never resolve anything, and finally give up on it, moving on to the practical problems of getting thru school, and getting into a career. We ultimately just have to take for granted that “I” am in here, and that “you” are in there (inside our skulls), and can’t really get much beyond that. Reading in psychology and philosophy on these issues is not much more helpful than our own reflections on how we feel, inside our own skulls. So, the sense of personal identity is a subject of continuing discussion in the Philosophy of Mind, and more recently in the experimental psychology of consciousness, but remains deeply puzzling.
I take it that the sense of personal identity is largely coexistent with self-consciousness. When we are unconscious, as in deep sleep (not REM), passed out, or for a medical operation, there is no sense of self, so to argue that personal identity is preserved is to argue that self-consciousness is preserved. Thus, the current major theories regarding what consciousness “is” are relevant to the “preservation under deconstruction/reconstruction” question.
Whether the sense of personal identity could survive a deconstruction/reconstruction operation at the atomic level (e.g., with the reconstructed “double” limited in its replication accuracy only by the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle regarding the scanning and reconstruction operation) must depend on how we define the “self identity entity/process” that is to be preserved (i.e., operationally, what is the “sense of personal identity”?). ‘Course, no one has a decent answer to that, so we remain on largely speculative grounds.
An initial scanning constrained by Heisenberg fidelities introduces inevitable inaccuracies in the data base files that represent the individual. So also, when we put the individual back together again, Heisenberg limits the accuracy with which atoms can be repositioned, the energy levels of the electron structure established when the machine (the person) is started up again, etc. So, is what we are trying to preserve somehow dependent on the atomic-level accuracy of reconstruction? Roger Penrose (mathematician at Cambridge, I think) in his two books has argued that the secret of self-consciousness lays in the quantum processes in the brain. He doesn’t know how it works, but on this hypothesis, we may have problems with the verisimilitude of the reconstruction at the atomic level. It is a distinctly minority view.
One argument against the importance of the atomic-level details is, as you correctly point out, that the atomic-level fabric of our bodies is replaced by natural processes about once every seven years by natural regenerative processes (different organs at different rates) with no apparent effect on the way we feel about “ourselves”. In fact, one has to wonder just what losses do ultimately affect our sense of personal identity. People loose their limbs in accidents and war, loose organs, even loose parts of their brains and are still “the same” (based on their reports). People have replacement organs (natural and artificial) with no apparent impact on their sense of identity. People with brain injuries go into these deep comas for months or years without anyone apparently being “at home”, then wake up one day and suddenly “they” are there again. Paraplegics can loose all sensation of everything below the neck, and still seem to be the “same” person. So just what has to be destroyed before one no longer is the “same” person, and is that something likely to be impacted by a transporter deconstruction/ reconstruction?
The most common disease process that does destroy personal identity is Alzheimer’s. It progressively destroys memories, and constrains the individual victim’s emotional responses to people and things that they should remember. Watching this happen (my mother has it, age 89) leads one to conclude that “personal identity” is in large measure a matter of long-term memory. Once memory is gone, the “person” is no longer there. There may be a shell left that can still talk to you, but ultimately they forget who you are, and shared common memories disappear. I don’t know what it fells like inside the skull, but to all external observers, the”person” is gone when the memories are gone. Alzheimer’s appears to be caused by chemical changes in the brain’s operation at the neuronal level, not anything at the atomic level. We are talking here about neuronal- level modifications in how long-term memory is stored.
I tentatively conclude, then, though with only weak empirical justification, that whatever “I” am is closely associated with my long-term memories. Thus, any deconstruction/reconstruction operation that preserves those memories will generate another “me” that feels, looks, and acts like the pre-deconstruction “me”. And, not being a Penrosian, I believe that long-term memories are stored in the neuronal firing patterns, not in any atomic/quantum-level details of the brain.
Thus, I further conclude that a hypothesized deconstruction/reconstruction limited in accuracy by Heisenberg would not introduce errors in the reconstruction at the scale (inter-neuron firing patters) in which long-term memory resides. Thus the hypothesized replication/transmission process would not destroy the sense of personal identity (assuming the bloody machine works properly).
Of course, this could all be total nonsense and I could be completely wrong. At least I’m not going to be the first one to volunteer to be sliced and diced and squirted around the planet at light speed. Leave that to you more adventurous types in the younger generation.
Quantum cheers to you,
DHQ
1 February, 2008 at 6:49 am
vulcanis
DHQ,
You mention the beliefs of Roger Penrose (a colleague of Stephen Hawking I believe). I too have a hard time swallowing such explanations of consciousness. It seems that there are too many unknowns, with quantum theory conveniently filling the knowledge gap. Basically, “we don’t know how either of these processes really work, therefore they must be related at some subliminal level”. The attraction here, I believe, is that the indeterminant nature of quantum theory provides a convenient ‘back door’ through which free-will is preserved. Inherent randomness introduced by the Hisenberg Uncertainty Principle is cajoled into an explanatory role that somehow (no one is really sure how) provides the necessary spark for freedom of will.
I am not convinced by this argument, due in part to the inability of quantum phenomenon to perpetuate at a macro, everyday level. Counter-arguments include the ‘many worlds’ hypothesis (among others) but again it does seem to be a theory that is convenient due to our ignorance of what is really happening.
Your discussion on organ replacement is also interesting. I think my views differ slightly. The replacement of a limb with an artificial aid could arguably result in a similar change to identity. For example, the paraplegic may take up disabled sports and thus identify with that sub-population primarily (as opposed to his previous peer group), taking new friendships and activities that are different to the norm. It really all hinges on what you define as identity.
I also take note of your idea that memory is largely responsible for identity. I believe that memory is rather supplementary to identity; it provides the means with which to modify our identities based on mistakes and past experience. In this capacity I believe memory does not equate with identity, rather it is a means to an end, allowing the expression of faculties with which to keep identities in check and modify them as needed.
The main argument I would present is that a patient with specific brain injury may have no capacity to retain or access stored memories, however the person still ‘is’ the same being as before. It is another case of how a line is drawn in the sand based on graduating layers of functionality; is a person classed as disabled when they have a non-functioning leg? How about a non-functioning foot? What about a paralysed toe? At what stage is the classification made with identity – memories that pertain directly to the individual or ones that incorporate others?
You mention that identity is facilitated by a kind of memory ’sharing’; common memories that people use to talk about the past. Is this more a method of forming relationships as opposed to personal identity? Allowing people to think they share a common bond through mutual external experience raises the level of intimacy and may even facilitate better communication (remember when we did X…). Therefore, a shortcut to eliciting brain states is employed, which speeds up the communicative process and helps to connote meaning more efficiently.
Perhaps our theories on identity are directly testable, although I would move with caution in regards to the ethics involved with such an undertaking. Suppose neuroscience progresses to a point whereby individual brains could be grown in-vitro, and the neuronal information from one brain scanned and implemented into the network of another. However I do conceed that once we have reached this point it will probably be rendered moot – I think we would have a good idea of brain function. Could we possibly ‘grow’ an identical copy of a brain, complete with memories and such, and simply plant this new brain within a grown body. Thus we achieve immortality without loosing previous memories or identity and circumvent technological difficulties in replicating brains (we simlpy copy them from nature; no fiddly AI).
Conducting a monumental backflip, I do support your conclusion that quantum replication would result in a perfect copy of the original being, negating the possible influence of Heisenberg. While we may not agree on the specific characteristics encompassed by identity, it is suffice to say that the macro level brain structures could be reliably reproduced without any ruckuss due to mystical quantum fluctuations somehow depriving the copy of its original consciousness. I think the main problem here is that people still hold consciousness with an almost religious reverence; they class it as somehow a distinctly separate phenomenon that cannot be reduced to the ugly level of physical neuronal arrangement.
Even memory is a relatively simplistic process, with small networks neurons ‘learning’ to connect with specific neighbours (long-term potentiation). In this sense, memories are grown by physically changing the structure of the neural net locally. Surely this is a similar process to that which governs consciousness. Again, it is a subject with conclusions depending upon the initial definition. Consciousness can either be defined as an emergent, amalgamated feature of the entire brain or a specific nodule responsible for giving us the ‘awareness’ factor.
I don’t know what you mean about us younglings being more willing to embrace certain death! Bring Laika the space dog down from orbit and use her instead! After all, animals are the expendible ones (although that’s certainly a debatable point in itself!).
1 February, 2008 at 3:19 pm
Dennis Quine
V:
I think our problem is that no one has a tractable operational definition of what “self-consciousness/personal identity” actually is (are). We know what it feels like inside our own skulls, but the evidence I have that you are actually a conscious biological entity is pretty slim. Could be I am just writing notes to a computer program like ELIZA(?). If so, I’d like to meet your programmer and have a real conversation!
So if we exercise our magic deconstructor/reconstructor machine, and look at the result, we only have the reports of the reconstructed individual, plus data from overt testing like checking sensory-motor skills, knowledge, etc. to verify that the original person has been reproduced, and not a simulacrum.
This problem gets a lot of press in the current philosophy discussions regarding development of a self-conscious robot. Just because the robot tells us he (she/it) is “in there”, i.e., self-conscious, does not mean he really is. We have only external indicators to validate the claim. When the external indicators disappear (as in Alzheimer’s when personal shared memories fade and are ultimately gone), then we question whether the “person” is actually “in there” any more.
I think we are unlikely to resolve this because self-consciousness/self identity are global self-organized manifestations of billions of neurons learning, growing, integrating, etc. It is not a thing that can be taken out and examined the way most of science works. Like the coloring on the chameleon’s skin: kill the animal and the coloration disappears, the skin of a dead animal is just grey.
My reading of Penrose is the same as yours: he is trying to find a way for free will to exist in an otherwise largely deterministic universe, and invokes quantum uncertainty. But I think it is a reach, and haven’t seen anybody else on that bandwagon.
By the way, Kurzweil argues that when we get to the Singularity and robot intelligence exceeds human by orders of magnitude, we can all just download our consciousness into computer data bases and become immortal. I thought that idea was stupid the first time I read it (and still do). Kurzweil is a very bright guy and very successful inventor, but that idea that self-consciousness is a cluster of programs in the brain that can be taken out and moved around on floppy discs just flies in the face of everything I know.
Whatever.
Can’t understand why you don’t want to volunteer for that first deconstruction/reconstruction mission. We’ll download all your memories into a computer data base before we slice and dice. Then if the magic reconstruction machine has a glitch, you can at least live out your life inside a shiny new IBM PC. What’s so bad about that?
(This is a Turing question to see if you really are an ELIZA-type program),
Happy computing,
DHQ
2 February, 2008 at 4:14 am
Dennis Quine
V:
Current edition of SEED (a science journal published in the US, but you may get it in Australia also). Jan 2008 edition contains an article on the “Blue Seed” computer experiment being undertaken in Switzerland with IBM trying to accurately emulate a portion of a real brain (rat’s) at the neuron level. Goal is to scale up and actually build a self-conscious computer. In my view immense technological hubris (like Kurzweil), but never know until you try.
DHQ
4 February, 2008 at 4:21 am
vulcanis
It is interesting that our discussion has moved onto Turing-tests of machine intelligence/consciousness. While I haven’t read Turing’s original paper in full, I am familiar with his argument, that being that a neutral Judge cannot distinguish between the dialouges of a computer and a human.
Of course we have the infamous objection by Searle (Chinese room argument) which states that the adoption of a sufficiently detailed linguistic rule-set negates the necessity of actual comprehension and understanding of what is being discussed. Thus, the success of the machine is short-lived; it is but a hollow shell responding to input and spitting out correct responses automatically.
I have disagreements on both sides, which makes the waters even murkier. Firstly, I object to the validity of the Turing Test due to its subjectivity on behalf of the judge. There is also issues with the ability of the human to act convincingly – perhaps they will make a slip-up and give the judge cause for thinking of them as an automaton. So my issue here is one of human ability to judge in an objective and accurate manner.
The second issue I have supports Turing (indirectly) through a shot at Searle’s Chinese Room. Do we communicate via something with more substance than rules? Is our language really developed at a deeper level? I am not convinced on this point. It almost seems as though we do go through a period of rule setting (various grammatical errors with young children as they incorrectly generalise tense rules) which becomes so automated as to give the ‘illusion’ of meaning. Maybe we do operate at a superficial level of semantics, with a simplistic stimulus/reponse similar to what Searle advocates. We simply are unaware of this fact due to the regularity with which we exercise our communicative skills (perhaps some individuals would fail the Turing Test due to poor skills in this area).
So in summary, I think the Turing Test is more a test of language ability rather than some insight into the nature of consciousness. A kind of test that simply measures how good a machine is at ‘faking human’. Perhaps we should be testing computers based on introspection, which I believe is more closely related to consciousness and awareness than language (this simply gives us the ability to stimulate consciousness and share our internal states with others).
It is heartening to know that they are starting to create artificial brains, even if it is at the level of a rat. They have to start somewhere after all!
5 February, 2008 at 4:26 am
Dennis Quine
V:
Hmmm. OK. I concur. One interpretation of the proposed Turing test is that it is a test of language skill rather than an indication of what we are trying to test for: self-conscious awareness (or something that indicates “someone is home” in the computer, or in the reconstructed individual we have sliced and diced and sqiurted thru space). Its probably not fair to beat on Turing too much, since he was the first to even contemplate what kind of test might be needed to determine whether a computer possesses human-class awareness.
Remarkable that his proposal has held up for all these decades and concommitant progress in computer science/artifical intelligence. But not surprising that it might not be judged as adequate for our needs after all the progress.
Really nice collection of relevant essays: “The Turing Test” ed by Stuart Shieber, 2004. Paperback, not too expensive. Can’t claim I have read it all. Has Turing’s originals, plus comments by a number of philosophers. Daniel Dennet’s essay in this collection, by the way, argues that Turing’s Test in its original form is more than adequate for the purpose. Not sure he convinced me.
We may be drifting into a state of resignation the way we are in questions regarding what “intelligence” is. Many theories come and gone about what makes individuals “intelligent”, and we certainly can tell the differences between the brighter and less bright among us (mostly by their verbal behavior), but “intelligence” remains what is assessed by an “intelligence test”. Multiple factor theories aside (e.g., Gardner’s being the most recent incarnation), you still can’t drag “intelligence” out and plop it on a table to examine. It manifests (or not) in behavior in testing situations and difficult life situations requiring decision making.
So is that where we are with regard to self-consciousnes? Whether we ask the question of a computer, or of a reconstituted simulacrum that looks like the person we sliced and diced, we have to use some behavioral test (memory of old friends, whatever) to assess whether “anyone is at home”.
I’m becoming more convinced that ever that Descartes had it right: there is a little man (my ego) sitting there looking over everything I do. And he is made out of soul-stuff, not atom-stuff. So there really are two kinds of substances in the world: the material stuff made out of atoms, and the self-conscious stuff made out of magic soul material.
Works as well as these mechanical theories, at least for now.
Occurs to me, however, that it poses a new conundrum relating to your original essay: if we slice and dice (e.g., “Beam me up Scotty), does the soul-stuff get transmitted and reconstituted also, or are the reconstituted simulacrums that look like people really soulless zombies after going thru the matter transmitter?
Issues too deep for a mere engineer to grapple with.
Anyway, take care of yourself (and your inner self).
DHQ
1 December, 2008 at 1:57 am
zansky
Why bother teleporting when you can watch tv and fall asleep?
3 December, 2008 at 11:29 pm
Dennis Quine
Z:
Yeah, but we still have to get to the local convenience store occasionally to stock up on brews and chips for those long sessions in front of the TV. I forsee a large market for teleporters from couch potatos.
DHQ