Morality is a phenomenon that permeates through both society as a whole and also individually via the consciousness of independent entities. It is a force that regularly influences our behaviour and is experienced (in some form or another) universally, species-wide. Intuitively, morality seems to be at the very least, a sufficient condition for the creation of human groups. Without it, co-operation between individuals would be non-existent. But does morality run deeper? Is it, in fact, a necessary condition of group formation and a naturally emergent phenomenon that stems from the interaction of replicating systems? Or can morality only be experienced by organisms operating on a higher plane of existence – those that have the required faculties with which to weigh up pros and cons, engage in moral decision making and other empathic endeavors (related to theory of mind)?
The resolution to this question depends entirely on how one defines the term. If we take morality to encompass the act of mentally engaging in self-reflective thought as a means with which to guide observable behaviours (acting in either selfish or selfless interests), then the answer to our question is yes, morality seems to be inescapably and exclusively linked only to humanity. However, if we twinge this definition and look at the etiology of morality – where this term draws its roots and how it developed over time, one finds that even the co-operative behaviours of primitive organisms could be said to construe some sort of basic morality. If we delve even deeper and ask how such behaviours came to be, we find that the answer is not quite so obvious. Can a basic version of morality (observable through cooperative behaviours) result as a natural consequence of interactions beyond the singular?
When viewed from this perspective, cooperation and altruism seem highly unlikely; a system of individually competing organisms, logically, would evolve to favour the individual rather than the group. This question is especially prudent when studying cooperative behaviours in bacteria or more complex, multicellular forms of life, as they lack a consciousness capable of considering delayed rewards or benefits from selfless acts
In relation to humanity, why are some individuals born altruistic while others take advantage without cause for guilt? How can ‘goodness’ evolve in biological systems when it runs counter to the benefit of the individual? These are the questions I would like to explore in this article.
Morality, in the traditional, philosophical sense is often constructed in a way that describes the meta-cognitions humans experience in creating rules for appropriate (or inappropriate) behaviour (inclusive of mental activity). Morality can take on a vast array of flavours; evil at one extreme, goodness at the other. We use our sense of morality in order to plan and justify our thoughts and actions, incorporating it into our mental representations of how the world functions and conveys meaning. Morality is a dynamic; it changes with the flow of time, the composition of society and the maturity of the individual. We use it not only to evaluate the intentions and behaviours of ourselves, but also of others. In this sense, morality is an overarching egoistic ‘book of rules’ which the consciousness consults in order to determine whether harm or good is being done. Thus, it seeps into many of our mental sub-compartments; decision making, behavioural modification, information processing, emotional response/interpretation and mental planning (‘future thought’) to name a few.
As morality entertains such a privileged omni-presence, humanity has, understandably, long sought to not only provide standardised ‘rules of engagement’ regarding moral conduct but has also attempted to explain the underlying psychological processes and development of our moral capabilities. Religion, thus, could perhaps be the first of such attempts at explanation. It certainly contains many of the idiosyncrasies of morality and proposes a theistic basis for human moral capability. Religion removes ultimate moral responsibility from the individual, instead placing it upon the shoulders of a higher authority – god. The individual is tasked with simple obedience to the moral creeds passed down from those privileged few who are ‘touched’ with divine inspiration.
But this view does morality no justice. Certainly, if one does not subscribe to theistic beliefs then morality is in trouble; by this extreme positioning, morality is synonymous with religion and one definitely cannot live without the other.
Conversely (and reassuringly), in modern society we have seen that morality does exist in individuals whom lack spirituality. It has been reaffirmed as an intrinsically human trait with deeper roots than the scripture of religious texts. Moral understanding has matured beyond the point of appealing to a higher being and has reattached itself firmly to the human mind. The problem with this newfound interpretation is that in order for morality to be considered as a naturally emergent product of biological systems, moral evolution is a necessary requirement. Put simply, natural examples of moral systems (consisting of cooperative behaviour and within group preference) must be observable in the natural environment. Moral evolution must be a naturally occurring phenomenon.
A thought experiment known as the “Prisoner’s dilemma” summarises succinctly the inherent problems with the natural evolution of mutually cooperative behaviour. This scenario consists of two parties, prisoners, whom are seeking an early release from jail. They are given the choice of either a) betraying their cellmate and walking free while the other has their sentence increased – ‘defecting’ or b) staying silent and mutually receiving a shorter sentence – ‘cooperating’. It becomes immediately apparent that in order for both parties to benefit, both should remain silent and enjoy a reduced incarceration period. Unfortunately, and also the catalyst for the terming of this scenario as a dilemma, the real equilibrium point is for both parties to betray. Here, the pay-off is the largest – walking free while your partner in crime remains behind with an increased sentence. In the case of humans, it seems that some sort of meta-analysis has to be done, a nth-order degree of separation (thinking about thinking about thinking), with the most dominant stratagem resulting in betrayal by both parties.
Here we have an example of the end product; an advanced kind of morality resulting from social pressures and their influence on overall outcome (should I betray or cooperate – do I trust this person?). In order to look at the development of morality from its more primal roots, it is prudent to examine research in the field of evolutionary biology. One such empirical investigation (conducted by Aviles, 2002that is representative of the field involves the mathematical simulation of interacting organisms. Modern computers lend themselves naturally to the task of genetic simulation. Due to the iterative nature of evolution, thousands of successive generations live, breed and die in the time it takes the computer’s CPU to crunch through the required functions. Aviles (2002) took this approach and created a mathematical model that begins at t = 0 and follows pre-defined rules of reproduction, genetic mutation and group formation. The numerical details are irrelevant; suffice to say that cooperative behaviours emerged in combination with ‘cheaters’ and ‘freeloaders’. Thus we see the dichotomous appearance of a basic kind of morality that has evolved spontaneously and naturally, even though the individual may suffer a ‘fitness’ penalty. More on this later.
“[the results] suggest that the negative effect that freeloaders have on group productivity (by failing to contribute to communal activities and by making groups too large) should be sufficient to maintain cooperation under a broad range of realistic conditions even among nonrelatives and even in the presence of relatively steep fitness costs of cooperation” Aviles, (2002).
Are these results translatable to reality? It is all well and good to speak of digital simulations with vastly simplified models guiding synthetic behaviour; the real test comes in observation of naturally occurring forms of life. Discussion by Kreft and Bonhoeffer (2005) lends support to the reality of single-celled cooperation, going so far as suggesting that “micro-organisms are ever more widely recognized as social”. Surely an exaggerated caricature of the more common definition of ‘socialness’, however the analogy is appropriate. Kreft et al effectively summarise the leading research in this field, and put forward the resounding view that single-celled organisms can evolve to show altruistic (cooperative) behaviours. We should hope so; otherwise the multicellularity which led to the evolution of humanity would have nullified our species’ development before it even started!
But what happened to those pesky mutations that evolved to look out for themselves? Defectors (choosing not to cooperate) and cheaters (choosing to take advantage of altruists) are also naturally emergent. Counter-intuitively, such groups are shown to be kept in their place by the cooperators. Too many cheaters, and the group fails through exploitation. The key lies in the dynamic nature of this process. Aviles (2002) found that in every simulation, the number of cheaters was kept in control by the dynamics of the group. A natural equilibrium developed, with the total group size fluctuating according to the number of cheaters versus cooperators. In situations where cheaters ruled; the group size dropped dramatically, resulting in a lack of productive work and reduced reproductive rates. Thus, the number of cheaters is kept in check by the welfare of the group. It’s almost a love/hate relationship; the system hates exploiters, but in saying that, it also tolerates their existence (in sufficient numbers).
Extrapolating from these conclusions, a logical outcome would be the universal adoption of cooperative behaviours. There are prime examples of this in nature; bee and ant colonies, migratory birds, various aquatic species, even humans (to an extent) all work together towards the common good. The reason why we don’t see this more often, I believe, is due to convergent evolution – different species solved the same problem from different approaches. Take flight for example – this has been solved separate times in history by both birds and insects. The likelihood of cooperation is also affected by external factors; evolutionary ‘pressures’ that can guide the flow of genetic development. The physical structure of the individual, environmental changes and resource scarcity are all examples of such factors that can influence whether members of the same species work together.
Humanity is a prime example; intrinsically we seem to have a sense of inner morality and tendency to cooperate when the conditions suit. The addition of consciousness complicates morality somewhat, in that we think about what others might do in the same situation, defer to group norms/expectations, conform to our own premeditated moral guidelines and are paralyzed by indecisiveness. We also factor in environmental conditions, manipulating situations through false displays of ‘pseudo-morality’ to ensure our survival in the event of resource scarcity. But when the conditions are just so, humanity does seem to pull up its trousers and bind together as a singular, collective organism. When push comes to shove humanity can work in unison. However just as bacteria evolve cheaters and freeloaders, so to does humanity give birth to individuals that seem to lack a sense of moral guidance.
Morality must be a universal trait, a naturally emergent phenomenon that predisposes organisms to cooperate towards the common good. But just as moral ‘goodness’ evolves naturally, so too does immorality. Naturally emergent cheaters and freeloaders are an intrinsic part of the evolution of biological systems. Translating these results to the plight of humanity, it becomes apparent that such individual traits are also naturally occurring in society. Genetically, and to a lesser extent, environmentally, traits from both ends of the moral scale will always be a part of human society. This surely has implications for the plans of a futurist society, relying solely on humanistic principles. Moral equilibrium is ensured, at least biologically, for the better or worse. Whether we can physically change the course of natural evolution and produce a purely cooperative species is a question that can only be answered outside the realms of philosophy.
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1 December, 2007 at 8:44 pm
Dennis Quine
V:
Some Reflections on the Emergence of Multilevel Morality and Apparent Altruism
Your essay on these issues is pretty wide ranging, so I will only pick a few items to critique, lest my comments become longer than your original ruminations. First, let me state in my words what I think the thesis is that you were defending. It appears that the most concise summary of your thesis is the first sentence of the last paragraph:
“Morality must be a universal trait, a naturally emergent phenomenon that predisposes organisms to cooperate towards the common good.”
It strikes me that there are really two ideas working here: the idea that cooperative action can be beneficial for all concerned, and thus “emerges” in the behavior of many organisms, even some that appear not to have any sense of “self” at all. The second idea, that I take to be a separate issue, is the justification of cooperative action on the basis of a moral code, so that one would be able to call it “altruistic”.
I have no trouble with the idea that cooperation is displayed by many if not all plants and animals, else how did evolution ever produce multi-cellular organisms. It also manifests at the behavioral level (hunting packs, social insects, etc.). So examples of cooperative activities are abundant, and the case really has already been made. The explanation for such cooperative aggregations and groups has also been made in terms of the “selfish gene” and self-preservation. So we don’t have to hypothesize some emergent property outside Darwinian mechanics to understand how group cohesion and apparent cooperation can emerge.
I don’t think I can concur, however, with calling such activities “moral” or “altruistic” outside the human context. You ask the question in your first paragraph: “…can morality only be experienced by organisms on a higher plane of existence…?” My response is “yes” immediately, because of the conventional understanding of what “morality” means. “Moral” acts are behaviors that are consistent with a socially accepted set of standards. What the society is, of course, will determine what types of actions/behavior is considered moral. For example, here is clearly a discontinuity between the behavior approved by Islamic Fundamentalism (e.g. killing any non-Muslims (infidels) you can) and that of Humanism. But both sets of morals would claim to be legitimate: one derived from the Koran, the other from the insights of the Enlightenment.
But that is beside the point, the key issue is that a moral act is behavior that is consistent with some society’s moral code; i.e., the act would be approved of by others living by the same code. Aristotle asserts that a moral act must contain the factor of choice. I cannot be said to have acted morally unless I had a free choice to act consistently with a set of standards, or not. John Dewey is also a protagonist of the position that reason and foresight are essential to moral acts. In Dewey, I have to understand the implications of my actions (for myself and others) and to weigh the contribution the act makes to my ultimate goals before I can choose, and thus can be said to have acted “morally”.
We can discuss the many moral codes that have been proposed and are being employed by people around the world today, but I think it is inconsistent with general usage of the term to try to extend “morality” to non-human creatures. “Cooperation” clearly (on the evidence) applies to “lower” organisms and creatures, but “morality” does not, because they (animals) don’t understand the ideas of “choice”, “consequences”, and what it means to have a moral code.
“Altruism” is a potential action (behavior) that is construed to benefit others (individuals or a group), while either being detrimental to the individual performing the act, or at the least not aiding the individual. I will argue here (following Aristotle) that altruism only manifests itself if the individual has a choice about the action, and understands the choice. Altruistic acts are like other moral acts: only people are capable of them because only people are capable of understanding choices and the implications of those choices. If we see animals doing things that (in humans) appear to be altruistic, then we need to go back to selfish gene theory and try an explanation of the behavior that starts out assuming the organism seeks to improve the survival of its genetic endowment. Nothing wrong with that (we all try to take care of our kids), but I believe it is inappropriate to ascribe “altruistic” motives when the conditions (outlined above) of human moral acts are not evident.
It appears that you cut off your discussion of the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) before really making the point you were trying to illustrate. The single trial PD really has no escape unless something outside the game can impact player decisions. For instance, if the two players are members of the same gang, and they know that they will be killed by the other members if they “rat out” their fellow suspect, then they both are motivated to clam up and thus escape the worst case payoff, which is actually outside the game (death). They thus inadvertently both play “trust”, and escape the worst case payoff inside the game, and also thereby escape the dilemma within the game. But if the game is strictly constrained to the payoff matrix and the strategies available to each player, without exterior influences on “trustworthyness”, there is no escape. Each thug “rats out” the other, and both get the max sentence.
The point you are driving for, I think, is better illustrated by the Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma (IPD), where the game is played repeatedly, and alternative strategies can be explored by each player. Computer simulations of repeated play have allowed exploration of the long-term implications of different strategies (e.g., randomly jumping from “betray” to “trust”, consistent playing “trust”, etc.). The consistently winning long-term strategy is “tit for tat” (Axelrod: “The Evolution of Cooperation”). In this strategy, I play “trust” as long as you do. But if you play “betray”, then on the next cycle of the game, I switch to “betray”, and you get your just dues. One cycle late, but as soon as both players realize that justice is immediate and inevitable, the games settle down and everyone enjoys “tit for tat”. Defectors are punished almost immediately.
So can one argue that the IPD illustrates how higher level “morality” (doing what helps others) can emerge from a game where I am really acting totally selfishly? I get paid back almost immediately for doing good (i.e., playing “trust”), and also get punished almost immediately for playing “betray”. I don’t really care what happens to you, but I want to improve my chances of success in this constrained punish/reward situation, so I play a strategy that improves your situation and thereby also demonstrate my “altruism” (?). My decisions on how to play IPD certainly constitute “moral acts” in terms of the Aristotle/Dewey criterion proposed earlier: I have choices and I understand the consequences. But do selfish acts on my part that inadvertently help the other player constitute “altruism”?
Axelrod (and others) has exhaustively explored the implications of these results, but the part that always bothered me was the need for both immediate (almost) and assured punishment of the defaulting player. Apparent altruism emerges in the IPD because rewards and punishment are tightly controlled and administered quickly. In both classical and instrumental learning, one of the things we observe is that the more rewards (punishments) are separated in time from the act being conditioned, the weaker the learning association. Ultimately, action and reward (punishment) can be separated so far in time that there is no conditioning effect: the organism doesn’t realize that the reward was even associated with something it did long ago.
So, in trying to generalize from IPD to argue that cooperation and “altruism” can emerge on their own, if the reward/punishment structure is correctly organized, we do have to also argue that the reward/punishment timing must be sufficiently tight. And that is the reason PD or IPD rarely seems to work as a useful model in the larger society. Except in constrained situations, rewards and punishment are too disconnected from actions.
An obvious case where it does work is team sports. Only the team wins games, not individuals, so acting to make it possible for my teammate to be a star, can result in immediate team success, which rewards me. However, I’m not really being altruistic, I really want to share in the glory, and can only do so if the team is successful. It also works in military situations: my chances of survival are improved if I help my fellows to do their job and survive. Loners don’t make it. You have to have help to survive on the battlefield. So there is immediate reciprocity. But once again , the motivation at the core is selfish: I want to survive, and know my prospects are improved if we all survive together.
I think there are deep issues here that are not yet fully resolved. Dawkins would argue that virtually all apparently altruistic behavior can be ascribed to selfish acts intended to promote the survival of my genome into future generations. Much of this explanatory framework is at work in evolutionary psychology, and seems compelling. Unfortunately it leads one to conclude that “altruism” is a fiction and an unnecessary explanatory concept. We can understand all apparently “altruistic” behavior as strictly elaborations of evolutionary strategies of our selfish genes (?). Maybe so.
Take care,
DHQ
21 January, 2008 at 5:04 am
Meditations on morality « Jotlab
[...] morality Tags: Evolution, morality, psychology, religion, responsibility, theism, universals In a previous article, I discussed the possibility of a naturally occurring morality; one that emerges from interacting [...]